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UNIVERSALISM AND THE SUPPOSED ODDITY OF
OUR EARTHLY LIFE: REPLY TO MICHAEL MURRAY
Thomas Talbott

In "Three Versions of Universalism," Michael Murray asks what purpose our
earthly life might serve if universalism is true; and in this brief response, I sug-

gest a possible answer.

In an article that recently appeared in this journal,1 Michael Murray puts to
universalists in general, and to me in particular, a question that deserves
an answer. Behind the question he raises lies the supposed empirical fact
that millions of people die in unbelief and in an unrepentant state; so if
they too will be perfected in the end, as land other universalists believe,
then their perfection must be completed in a post-mortem life of son1e
kind. This leads Murray to ask: Given that "the earthly life appears to
yield poor soteriological results," just what purpose does it "serve in the
outworking of God's plan for his human creation?"2 Murray goes on to
comment: "Obviously, the post-mortem state in which most turn to God is
vastly better suited [given the universalist's view] for the conversion of the
unregenerate. But if so, why not create us all ab initia, in this latter state?"3
Why not, in other words, just skip the earthly life, with all of the separation, trials, and tribulations it includes, and simply bring everyone to perfection, quickly and painlessly, in a post-mortem existence of some kind?
The question is important because it seems to express a widespread
worry among the opponents of universalism. Even as opponents of
Augustinian predestination sometimes worry that our earthly life would
have no intelligible purpose if the eternal destiny of the elect should be
secure from the beginning, so Murray worries that our earthly life would
have no intelligible purpose if God's irresistible grace should likewise
extend to the entire human race. What purpose might our present choices
serve if the end is already secure? It is St. Paul, of course, who declares that
"one man's act of righteousness leads to justification and life for all" (the
very same "all," by the way, who died in Adam).4 It is also Paul who
insists that our destiny "depends not on human will or exertion, but on
God who shows mercy."5 But if all of tl1is is true, what might a plausible
purpose for our earthly existence be?
Now as Murray hirnself acknowledges, a failure on the part of universalists to answer such questions would in 110 way undermine their view. 6 But
fortunately, Llniversalists have, and have provided, a host of plausible
answers. My own answer will involve two steps: first, an examination of
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Murray's assumption that our "earthly life appears to yield poor soteriological results," and second, an account of how, even though we do not choose
(freely or otherwise) our own destiny, libertarian free choice is nonetheless
an essential part of the process whereby eod perfects us in the end.

Why should anyone suppose that the earthly life yields "poor soteriological results"? The answer will depend, I presume, upon one's criterion
for soteriological success. It is certainly true that virtuallY no one, Christian
or non-Christian, achieves moral and spiritual perfection in this earthly life.
So if the criterion for soteriological success is moral and spiritual perfection, then success is indeed rare (perhaps even nonexistent) in this realm.
It harclly follows, however, that the events in our earthly lives have no
important role to play in perfecting us; nor does it follow that eod could
simply have skipped the earthly life, have started us out ll1 something like
a post-mortem state, and successfully have perfected us nonetheless. What
is true, perhaps, is that the earthly life is better sLlited for establishing the
need for redemption in the first place and for getting the process underway
than it is for completing the process. 7 So perhaps a better criterion for soteriological success would be the extent to which our earthly lives prepare
the way for a fuller and more perfect union with eod in the future; and
when judged by that criterion, I want to insist, every human life, even the
most seemingly tragic, represents a degree of soteriological success.
Consider Adolf Hitler, just for purposes of illustration, and compare
hirn to Saul of Tarsus. We are, of course, in no position to assess the hearts
of others and in no position, therefore, to make such a comparison. But
tl1at is, in asense, just rny point. Do we have any reason to believe that
Hitler's hatred of the Jews whom he persecuted, terrorized, and murdered
was any greater than Saul's hatred of the Christians whom he persecuted,
terrorized, and murdered? True, Saul did not have at his disposal the
power of a modern state (or 20th Century technology), so his destructive
activities were to that extent limited. But even on the road to Damascus, he
was "still breathing threats and murder against the disciples of the Lord."8
If anyone might have seemed incorrigible, at least to those early Christians
who l1ad learned to fear hirn, it would have been Saul of Tarsus. Because
we know what happened on the road to Damascus and thereafter, however, we have little trouble seeing a soteriological success here. In the case of
Hitler, it is quite different; we are unaware of any dramatic conversion (or
revelation) that may have occurred at the el1d his earthly life. Still, we have
no reason to deny that Hitler was in a far more hopeful condition at the
end of his life, after all of his evil plans and ambitions had corne to ruin,
than he was at any time previously. Indeed, even as Saul received a special
revelation on the road to Damascus, so the process whereby Hitler's plans
and ambitions had come to rLlin mayaIso have been a revelation to
Hitler-uniquely sLlited, perhaps, to his own spiritual needs.
But if Hitler does find his cure in a post-mortem state of some kind, why
should eod not simply have created hirn "ab initia, in this latter state?"
Behind the question lies Murray's conviction that, given universalism, "the
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post-mortem state in which most turn to God is vastly better suited [than is
the earthly life] for the conversion of the unregenerate." We must not
make the mistake of supposing, however, that God's redemptive activities
in the post-mortem realm, as efficient as they may be, are logically independent of our earth1y lives; to the contrary, as I and many other universalists conceive the matter, an earthly life will in many cases play an essential
role in God's unique redemptive activities in the post-mortem realm.
Some universalists have supposed, for example, that God reserves his
harshest forms of punishment (or his severest means of correction)-namely, purgatorial suffering in hell or temporary banishment to the outer darkness-for the post-mortem realm; many others have supposed that an
important redemptive activity in the post-mortem realm will be the earthly
life review; and for my OWl1. part, I suspect that God has a special way of
teaching us the true meaning of our selfish actions. In some cases at least,
he may require us to experience the effects of our actions from the perspective others, almost as if we were the one being affected; in that way, we
shallliterally reap what we have sown. A vicious child beater may thus be
required to experience the beatings he has administered, together with all
of the fear and the terror he has caused, from the perspective of the very
child he has beaten. He will be made to see 11.imself as tl1.e child sees hirn.
But none of tlLis would be possible in the absence of an earthly life. Hitler
could hardly be subject to punishment (or correction) for sins he never
committed; he could hardly engage in a life review if he had no earthly life
to review; and he could hardly experience the horror of the very gas chambers for which he was responsible if these had never existed.
Beyond the absurdity of SUPPOSÜ1.g that God could achieve his loving
purposes effectively by starting someone out in purgatory or even in the
outer darkness, there is also the mystery of creation itself. Because the creation of rational, independent, and self-aware beings such as ourselves is a
deep and unfathomable mystery, we can hardly pontificate 11.ow God
should have begun the process. But one tlLing seems clear: God must first
produce rational agents before he can perfect them and reveal hirnself fully
to them; not even God, after all, could reveal hirnself to a stone. So here is
one plausible account of why our earthly lives must be very different from
the post-mortem realm in which we fÜ1.ally achieve perfect union with God.
Perhaps some of the very conditions essential to our creation in the first
place and to the emergence of our unique personalities are themselves
obstacles to a perfect union with God-obstacles that God must subsequently overcome in a variety of complex ways after we have already come
into being. Might it not be, for example, that God's hiddenness is more than
a (questionable) concession to our freedom?-that it is also a metaphysically
necessary condition of our creation? Why suppose it even possible for creatures like us to develop self-awareness, or to become aware of ourselves as
distinct from God and from each other, or to develop a will of our own, in
an environment essentially different from the earthly one? For my own
part, at any rate, I suspect that the experience of ambiguity, frustration, separation, al1.d even alienation is an indispensable condition of our emergence
as rational, self aware beü1.gs; 9 and if this is true, then God could hardly
have started us out in astate in which such conditions do not exist.
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As I see it, then, the purpose of the earthly realm (and even the physical
cosmos as a whole) is just what John Hick and other proponents of a "soul
making theodicy" have proposed. The created universe provides an environment in which God can, first, bring us into being as independent, rational agents, and second, begill. teachill.g the lessons of love as he reconciles
us over time both to hirnself and to each other.
Our own moral freedom, moreover, is an. essential part of the complex
process whereby God transforms us into his children and perfeets us in the
end. But here a clarification or two is in order. As a universalist, I reject the
idea, which I suspect to be incoherent anyway, that we choose freely
betweerl different possible etemal destinies; I also reject the idea that we are
responsible Jor our etemal destiny, which is no less a gift from God than OLlr
birth iso I do 11.0t deny, of course, that God brings each of us to the point
where we voluntarily, wholeheartedly, and joyfully submit our wills to hirn;
indeed, I would insist upon that. But as for the further question of whether
the final act of submissiol1. on our part qualifies as a free choice in the standard libertarian sense,lO I have come, quite frankly, to doubt it. Haven't
Christians traditionally attributed even the transformation of their wills to
the work of the Holy Spirit within? As Paul wrote to the Philippians, "it is
God who works in you [both] to will and to act according to his good pleasure."ll And in transforming the sinner from the inside out, isn't it God's
purpose to elicit an act of submission so wholehearted, so full of love, and
so joyful that, at the moment of final submission, no alternative choice is
eVel1. thirlkable or psychologically possible? If so, al1.d if free choice (of the
standard libertarian kind) nonetheless plays an important role in the whole
process whereby God transforms the will and elicits the desired act of submission, then we need a fresh pieture, I believe, of just what that role iso
The pictLlre I would urge is this: Our free choices determine not our eternal destiny, which is secure from the beginning, but instead how God will
respond to us in the futLlre-that is, the means of grace he will employand how we will experience God's love within a given time-frame: whether,
for example, we will experience it as kindness or as severity. "Note then,"
writes Paul in his letter to the Romans, "the kindness and the severity of
God: severity toward those who have fallen, but God's kindness toward
you, provided you continue in his kindness; otherwise, you also will be cut
off."12 So how we encoLmter God in the futLlre is ll1.deed, says Paul, up to uso
But our ultimate destiny is not up to us, because God's severity, no less than
his kindness, is itself a means of his saving grace. In particular, God's severity towards the unbelieving Jews---even his willingness to blind them, to
harden their hearts, and to cut them off for a season-is according to Paul
but one of the means whereby God will save all of Israel in the end: "a hardening has come UPOl1. part of Israel.... And so all Israel will be saved."13
What our free choices determine, then, is not our eternal destiny, but the
means required to achieve it. For the more tenaciously we cling to our illusions and selfish desires-to the flesh, as Paul calls it-the more severe will
be the means and the more painful the process whereby God shatters our
illusions, destroys the flesh, and finally separates us from our sin.
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A virtue of the Christian religion, as I see it, is that Christians are never
permitted to take credit for their own redemption or even for a virtuous
character (where such exists). All credit of this kind goes to God. But the
Christian religion also stresses the importance of free choice, of choosing
this day whom you shall serve. Nor need there be any tension between
these two emphases, provided that we regard our free choices as determining not our etemal destiny, but the means of grace available to uso Essential
to the whole redemptive process, I am suggesting, is that we exercise our
moral freedom-not that we choose rightly rather than wrongly, but that
we choose freely one way or the other. We can choose today to live selfishly or unselfishly, faithfully or unfaithfully, obediently or disobediently. But
Ollr choices, especially the bad ones, will also have unintended and unforeseen consequences in our lives; as tl'le proverb says, "The human mind
plans the way, but the Lord directs the steps."14 A man who commits robbery may set off a chain of events that, contrary to his own intentions, lands
him in jail; and a woman who enters into an adulterous affair may discover
that, even though her husband remains oblivious to it, the affair has a host
of unforeseen and destructive consequences in her life. In fact, our bad
choices almost never get us what we really want; that is part of what makes
them bad and also one reason why God is able to bring redemptive goods
out of them. When we make a mess of our lives and our misery becomes
more and more unbearable, the hell we thereby create for ourselves will in
the end resolve the very ambiguity and shatter the very illusions that made
the bad choices possible in the first place. That is how God works with created rational agents. He permits them to choose in the ambiguous contexts
in which they first emerge as self-aware beings, and he then requires them
to leam from experience the hard lessons they sometimes need to leam.
Incompatibilists almost always suppose that our bad choices tend to produce a bad character, even as our good choices tend to produce a good
character; and withü'l very specific and very limited time-frames, such a
view may have a degree of merit. But this widespread view is also more of
an apriori conviction about how things must work than an empirical generalization about how things do work, and the supposed causal influences are
by no means obvious or easy to trace. A man who succumbs to sexual
temptation in his youth and then gets bumed may be less, rather than more,
likely to repeat the experiment later in life; and a woman who follows a consistent pattern of selfish behavior may plunge to the depths just prior to a
dramatic conversion and transformation. A pattern of bad cl'loices, in other
words, can be just as useful to God in correcting us and in teaching the
lessons of love as a pattern of good choices can be. And perhaps that is one
reason why Paul at least raises the embarrassing question: "Should we continue in sin in order that grace may abound?"15 After all, "where sin
increased, grace abounded all the more"16 But Paul's correct answer is also
most empl'latic: "By no means!" That the pain I experience when I thrust
my hand into a flame may serve a bel'leficial purpose-because it enables
me to avoid an even greater injury in the future-hardly entails that I have
a good reason to thrust my hand into the flame again and again. And similarly, that the misery and the unhappiness that sin brings into a life can
serve a redemptive purpose-because it can provide in the end a com-
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pelling motive to repent-hardly implies that one has a good reason to keep
on sinning and to continue making oneself more and more miserable.
Not that we are talking about a mechanical process here. God does not
always require, for example, that we experience immediately the potentially
bad consequences of our bad choices, and he may even protect us from
them, at least for a season. For as 1 already indicated in the previous section, many universalists believe that God reserves his harshest forms of
pllnishment (or his severest means of correction) for the next life when we
shall stand much more nakedly before our Creator. In the meantime, one
purpose of the earthly life may be to provide ample opportunities for less
severe forms of correction, and to demonstrate the justice of the more severe
forms, where such are necessary. More than a few have charged that universalists operate with an overly sentimental conception of God's love. But
no one who actually reads the early Christian universalists, such. as Origen
or St. Gregory of Nyssa, could possibly come away with that misconception. If anything, the idea that God will in the end destroy sin altogether17
rests upon a more rigorous conception of God's holy love than does the
idea that he will keep sin alive throughout an eternity of hell. For according
to the former idea, God will not permit any of us to cling forever to our illusions or to remain forever ignorant of the true nature of our selfish choices.
We are free to sin and perhaps even to sin with relative impunity for
awhile, but in no way are we free to sin with impunity forever. So unless
we first repent of our sin and step into the life that Christ brings to us, God
will sooner or later-in the next life, if not in this one-permit our illusions
to shatter against the hard rock of reality. Paul hirnself puts it this way:
"each man's works will become manifest; for the Day will disclose it,
because it will be revealed with fire, and the fire will test what sort of work
each one has done.... If any n1an's work is bumed up, he will suffer loss,
though he hirnself will be saved, but only as through fire." 18
No wonder the early Christian universalists were so fond of texts
describing God as "a consuming fire" 19 and warning that "It is a fearful
thing to fall into the hands of the living God." 20 For the image of fire represents both judgment and purification, two sides of the same coin, and the
idea was that the consuming fire of God's love would continue to burn us
until it finally purges us of all that is false within us.2 1 The more we freely
rebel against it and try to defeat it, the more deeply and inexorably it will
bum, until every conceivable motive for disobedience is consumed and we
are finally transformed from the inside out.
But why not, Mllrray asks, a more instantaneous transformation, without
the prolol1ged trials and tribulations? Why doesn't God just constitute all of
us as saints from the beginning? The short answer is that, even if feasible,
such an instantaneous transformation would be far less worthwhile than a
leaming process whereby rational agents choose freely, experience the consequences of their free choices, and finally leam from experience why love
and reconciliation are better than selfishness and separation. Consider (or
try to imagine) a world that has the same persons as the actual world, but
nonetheless differs from the actual world in the following respect: In our
imagined world there is no drama of history, no temptation or possibility of
acting wrongly, no moral freedom, no set of moral lessons to be leamed,
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and no struggle against evil to be won; in our in1agined world we are not
required, even for a season, to take responsibility for the immediate welfare
of anyone, whether it be our own or someone else's; in our imagined world
we have no need to forgive others and no sins to repent of ourselves; and
fin.ally, in our imagined world Christ's victory over sin and death could
serve no conceivable purpose and could have no possible meaning for uso
Despite the horrendous evils that the actual world includes, do we have any
reason to believe that our imagined world would be more worthwhile than,
or preferable as a whole to, the actual world?
Here, at any rate, is my OWl1. view of the matter. The existence of a
supremely powerful and supremely loving God is indeed inconsistent
with at least one kind of in1aginable evil, a kind that we might describe
roughly as involving irreparable harn1-that is, harm that not even
Omnipotence could ever repair or cancel out at some later time. It is logically impossible, for example, that God should grant me the freedom not
only to murder my brother, but to annihilate his soul altogether. For if
God truly loves n1y brother, then in his own n1ind no conceivable good
could outweigh such an evil as that. And for similar reasons, neither is it
possible that God should grant me the freedon1 to annihilate my own soul
or to undermine every chance of future happiness in myself. For God
draws the line at irreparable harn1. But various forms of temporary harm,
even evils that may appear utterly horrendous, are a different story. If
God's aim is to teach the lessons of love and to prepare us for eternity, then
a school similar to this earthly realm-where we are subject to being
harmed in ways that God can later repair, where we face real threats, dangers, and even tragedies of a temporary kind, and where we are required
to take some responsibility for each other's temporary welfare-may for all
we kI1.OW be the best means available to God for achieving that end.
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